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Mongolia’s 2015 Referendum via Text Messaging:  
Engaging Rural and Nomadic Citizens in Public Screen Deliberation 
 
ALLISON HAHN 
Baruch College, City University of New York, USA 
 
How can emergent democracies engage rural and mobile citizens in deliberative 
democracy? This article analyzes the ways that Mongolia’s two national referenda, the 
1945 vote for independence and the 2015 referendum on mining contracts, attempted to 
engage pastoral-nomadic citizens in national deliberations via a public screen. The analysis 
is prefaced by an examination of public political deliberation and the role of referenda in 
both settled and emergent democracies. This is followed by an assessment of Mongolia’s 
ICT development, which enabled the 2015 referendum to be held via short message 
service text messages and deliberated about over Twitter. I conclude that, although the 
2015 referendum did not result in a clear policy mandate, the method of using text 
messaging to distribute a national referendum shows great promise as a way to reach and 
engage even the most rural and mobile citizens.  
 




This study examines the use and implications of cellular phones in the political deliberations of rural 
and pastoral-nomadic herders in Mongolia. By focusing on Mongolia, a nation of 3 million people and 3.2 
million active mobile subscribers, I ask how cellular phones may enable new deliberative spaces in emergent 
democracies. Although many civil society scholars and activists have promoted new and social media as a 
way to broaden the public sphere in highly developed societies (Bijker, 2006; Gastil, 2008; Pfister & Godana, 
2012), little research has examined the structural configuration of interactions and transactions facilitated 
by new and social media in rural and developing democracies such as Mongolia (Dalaibuyan, 2013; Tencic, 
2015).  
 
My analysis begins with the role of public political argument and deliberative technologies in 
established and emergent democracies. Referenda are seen as a tool both to draw citizens into deliberations 
and for politicians to declare that a political topic has been decided. Then I conduct a comparative case 
study of Mongolia’s two national referenda, occurring in 1945 and 2015. Although much time passed 
between these referenda, and the format of the referenda differ, I argue that a comparison of these events 
illustrates the ways that rural and mobile communities have been engaged in national decision making. 
Drawing from the reports of government officials, national media, international observers, and, in the case 
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of the 2015 referendum, Mongolian deliberation via Twitter, I examine questions of national and 
international referendum validity to understand how national referenda can encourage or foreclose public 
deliberation. A qualitative analysis of tweets posted during the 2015 referendum is used to explore the 
reasons for citizen participation in and rejection of the 2015 referendum. The article concludes with and 
examination of the technological and democratic entanglements in holding a national referendum by short 
message service (SMS).  
 
Public Political Argument 
 
Zarefsky’s (2009) work concerning public political argument assesses topics that are necessarily 
public, and for which it seems that a debate will continue for a long period of time. He contends that long-
term debate is advantageous, but government agents will at times attempt to artificially constrict public 
debate in ways that consolidate governmental power. For example, citizens may want to take more time to 
study and debate a political topic, while a politician facing an election may desire an immediate vote. In this 
study of Mongolia, I examine the ways that politicians have attempted to foreclose long-standing 
deliberations in two cases: the 1945 referendum on independence and the 2015 referendum on mining 
policy. At first glance, each case seems to be a singular question of whether the nation should or should not 
act; however, argument scholars such as Mohammed (2016) indicate that public political arguments are 
often multipurposive activity types (p. 221), meaning that the officials who call for a vote, and the citizens 
who engage in deliberation and voting, are participating in a diversity of argumentative exchanges and 
outcomes. 
 
In the 1945 referendum, many citizens had already determined that Mongolia was and should be 
independent. Holding the referendum signaled Mongolia’s decision to be independent from China, worked 
to define Mongolian national unity, and smoothed relations between China and the Soviet Union. The 
situation was very different in 2015, when Prime Minister Saikhanbileg declared that Mongolians must decide 
whether they would sign or reject a mining contract with Oyu Tolgoi. Although members of the government 
and international mining corporations may have been ready to sign a contract, this article demonstrates 
that the public had not yet reached a consensus. Undecided Mongolian voters voiced a plethora of opinions 
during the 2015 referendum. This heterogeneous group of citizens was separated by both their different 
opinions and different starting points in the debate over mineral policy. Some voters had long-term interests 
in Mongolian mineral rights, while others only entered the debate when they received the government’s 
text-message referendum. This means that their engagement in this public argument meant different things 
for different participants. As a result, Mongolian voters did not reach the cohesive decision desired by the 
government but instead demonstrated the heterogeneous public commonly found in situations of dissensus 
(Zarefsky, 2009 p. 118). 
 
Evidence of the Mongolian voting public’s dissensus was found through new and social media such 
as Twitter. As DeLuca and Peeples (2002) argue, public screens encourage a shift from rationality and 
consensus to publicity, distraction, and dissent (p. 125). In the second part of this article, I follow the 
argument of DeLuca, Lawson, and Sun (2012), that public screens have changed the methods and 
production of political deliberation and activism, and analyze the ways that Mongolians used Twitter to 
respond to the referendum during and immediately following the vote. To understand how this shift from 
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public spheres to public screens has affected Mongolia, I juxtapose the 1945 and 2015 referenda. This 
juxtaposition highlights the ways that social media has allowed Mongolians to move beyond the constraints 
of older media.  
 
In studying how Mongolians approached, deliberated about, participated in, and responded to the 
national referenda of 1945 and 2015, I aim to better understand political deliberations in emergent 
democracies. This is important for scholars who are interested in Mongolia or other emergent or rural 
democracies that may also experiment with SMS referenda. For readers from more established democracies, 
particularly Western democracies, I point to Zarefsky’s (1992) “Spectator Politics,” in which he reminds 
readers of the irony that Western political deliberators have become “couch potatoes” (p. 413) while 
emergent democracies such as Mongolia are experimenting with direct political deliberation. He suggests 
that by studying distant democracies, Western scholars might realize how truncated their public spaces have 
become and search for emancipatory methods for revitalizing public sphere deliberations.  
 
This analysis begins with an overview of the role of referenda in both Western-style and emergent 
democracies. Then, utilizing a close reading of archival documents alongside social media posts, I examine 
Mongolia’s 1945 and 2015 referenda. I compare the two referenda by presenting the reason for holding a 
vote, the political milieu at the time of the vote, voter participation, international reports, and vote outcome. 
To understand the use of Twitter during the 2015 referendum, I apply qualitative analysis and clustered 
argumentative groups. After examining each referendum separately, I compare the events to understand 
both the long-term effect of each referendum and the ways that contemporary Mongolian political 




Referenda have been studied in Canada (Lea, 2006), Denmark (de Vreese & Semetko, 2004), 
England (Burnap, Gibson, Sloan, Southern, & William, 2015; Qvortrup, 2006), the European Union (Fossum 
& Menéndez, 2005), New Zealand (Aimer & Miller, 2002), the United States (Gastil, 2008) and U.S. 
territories such as Guam (Na’puti & Hahn, 2013). These studies address a range of questions from local 
policy to national independence. In each instance, scholars emphasize the need for quality public 
participation and debate before calling for a vote (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). In many nations, voters 
have been excluded from these deliberations due to their gender identity, race, or political status (Gastil, 
2008). Yet, because these referenda have occurred in long-standing democracies, scholars are able to 
assume that many of the voters have experience with a democratic system and have received critical 
thinking training during their formative education.  
 
Such democratic background and training is not a given in emergent democracies, such as 
Mongolia, where nearly half of the population was educated during a period of one-party, centralized socialist 
governance. The implications of this educational and social history are apparent in studies of referendum 
use in emergent and transitional democracies in Africa—specifically in Kenya (Pflanz, 2010), Egypt (Wing & 
Kassim, 2011), and South Sudan (Høigilt, Falch, & Rolandsen, 2010). For example, Pflanz’s report of Kenya’s 
2010 referendum illustrates the ways that SMS and Twitter were used to monitor volunteers and officials at 
referendum polling locations. Using the online platform uchaguzi (Kiswahili for “election”), election monitors 
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reported that politicians were attempting to influence voters, prompting international reports and 
investigations with the aim of limiting future illegal election practices and violence. Studies have also 
addressed early attempts to hold SMS polling in emergent post-Soviet democracies, such as Kyrgyzstan 
(Husky & Hill, 2011) and Armenia (Harutyunyan, 2014). For example, a referendum sponsored by the United 
Nations Development Programme was successfully deployed in Armenia, but it received lower than expected 
participation, even after citizens agreed in advance to participate (Harutyunyan, 2014). These studies from 
across the former Soviet Union and eastern Africa point to external factors—from election violence, to 
technological failings, to exceptionally low turnout—that are not unheard of in settled democracies but that 
put a strain on emergent democracies that are working to not only carry out a referendum but also to 
establish a national voting habit.  
 
Mongolia has held national, democratic elections since 1992. As Sabloff (2002) writes, Mongolian 
scholars look back to Chinggis Khaan’s (AKA Genghis Khan) reign to situate their democracy as a “logical 
outgrowth of their history” (p. 20) and differentiate Mongolia from other postsocialist nations. Using text 
messages to participate in deliberation fits well into this history of mobile communicative networks. 
Mongolia’s peaceful transition to democracy and multiparty political participation stand out among mass 
protests and at times violence that have occurred in other emergent democracies from the Soviet bloc 
(Ginsburg, 1995; Oleinik, 2012; Rossabi, 2005; Soni, 2004). For example, the only instance of election 
violence occurred in 2008, when protesters occupied the capital’s square, violently demonstrating and 
destroying numerous state buildings and archives. Oleinik (2012) has linked these protests to institutional 
exclusion. The 2015 referendum may be framed as a way in which even the most rural Mongolians could be 
drawn into national deliberations.  
 
Yet asking citizens for their opinions may not be enough to guarantee that all citizens would 
participate in a referendum (Gastil, 2008; McBride, 2005). Deliberative democracy also requires open and 
informed public participation (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). The use of new technologies in emergent 
democracies might be transitioning from Larry Diamond’s “liberation technology” into “deliberation 
technology” (Pfister & Godana, 2012). The use of these technologies also requires that citizens trust 
government collection and use of data (Susanto & Goodwin, 2013) and requires caution among election 
forecasters who may be tempted overinterpret social media participation (Huberty, 2014). Citizens who feel 
excluded from government institutions are unlikely to offer their trust the first time that they are engaged 
or when a new technology emerges. As Sabloff’s 2013 report indicates, many Mongolians express democratic 
ideals but do not anticipate democratic policies (Sabloff, 2013). Yet continual attempts at engagement, 
backed by sound democratic governance, may build the networks necessary for political engagement and 
deliberation. For example, in 2017, the Mongolian parliament met to discuss a constitutional reform that 
would legalize the use of deliberative polling. The work of trust building alongside technological development 
has the potential to engage Mongolia’s remote and mobile citizenry in new forms of deliberative citizenship.  
 
Mongolian Communicative Technologies 
 
Mongolian scholars trace the integration of new technologies into pastoral-nomadic lifestyles to 
Chingghis Khaan and his adaptation of mobile technologies during military campaigns (Bold, 2014; 
Enkhtuvshin, n.d.). Juxtaposing modernity and tradition, these scholars explain that pastoral-nomadic 
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communities have a strong future outlook and work to adopt new technologies to enhance their traditional 
lifestyles (Diener, 2011.) Outside observers, however, have framed Mongolian and North Asian use and 
development of technology as stagnant. For example, Mumford (1963) alludes to Tibetan Buddhist monks 
(many Mongolians are or were Tibetan Buddhists) when he writes, “Western monks gave rise to more fertile 
and complex kinds of machinery than prayer wheels” (p. 35). Similarly, Adas (1989) writes that Marx 
believed “Asiatic societies, burdened by bloated and despotic but highly centralized governments, had 
stagnated for centuries and fallen behind the West” (p. 238).  
 
Marxist technological determinism focused on communication and transportation infrastructure, as 
is evident in Mongolia’s quick integration of electronic media (Myagmar, 2001). With the support of the 
Soviet Union, Mongolia invested in national radio (1934) and television services (1967). The use of these 
technologies was guided by Soviet media theory, which argued that public ownership of media should be 
designed to serve the interests of the working class. Communicative technologies were designed to disperse 
information to the public in a one-directional flow of information, with little attention paid to how the public 
might send information back to government authorities (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1963). 
 
Rural Mongolian communities, however, did not lack deliberative opportunities. During the socialist 
period, groups such as families, schoolmates, coworkers, and neg nutgiinkhan (people from the same 
homeland) functioned similarly to the Russian blat, enforcing personal obligations and the norms of informal 
networks in formal contexts (Jargalsaikhan, 2012; Ledeneva, 2008). Neg nutgiinkhan included people who 
had moved to distant pasturelands or cities and tied them to communicative networks based on attachment 
to a pastureland traditionally used by their families. As such, the neg nutgiinkhan allowed private or sensitive 
information to travel across long spaces but confined trusted networks to historic connections as opposed 
to government officials or contemporary local communities. This practice facilitated private spheres of 
communication, but it could not inspire the type of public, inter-enclave deliberation necessary for a new 
democracy. 
 
The democratic transition (1990–1992) was soon followed by Internet access. Access expanded 
rapidly in cities, but development in the countryside was slower. I first worked in Mongolia in 2004, and at 
that time we took satellite phones with us on trips to the countryside. These phones could be used for a few 
hours each day via cellular signals bounced off the signals transmitted by cruise ships. This cost-prohibitive 
method put cellular phones out of reach for most of Mongolia’s rural population. When they needed to make 
a call, rural citizens traveled to the local post office to use a landline—a journey that required both extensive 
travel and time (because they had to wait at the post office for a free line and for the operator to connect 
their call).  
 
By 2011, rural residents were no longer reliant on post office phone lines. Due to the successful 
implementation of the “E-Mongolia” program and funding from the World Bank, all rural and urban districts 
have mobile phone service. Rural herders now have access to satellite-based public phone service, and 34 
of the largest districts have broadband Internet access (World Bank, 2011). The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
(2012) Asian media barometer reports that ownership of cell phones worldwide has stayed at a constant 
80%. However, in Mongolia, 120% of the population owns a cellular phone. This unlikely statistic indicates 
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that many Mongolians own multiple cellular phones, which enables users to separate personal and business 
calls as well as to navigate the coverage and pricing schemes provided by competing cellular companies.  
 
Because many Mongolian phones accommodate multiple SIM cards, offices such as the 
Communications Regulatory Commission of Mongolia count SIM cards rather than cellular phones. Its 2015 
report indicates 3,068,200 active mobile subscribers in a nation of 2.9 million citizens. Of those mobile SIM 
cards, 2.2 million had 3G access and 1.9 million were used in smartphones (Communications Regulatory 
Commission of Mongolia, 2016). As a result of this expansive cellular coverage, Mongolia ranked 84th in the 
2015 information and communication technologies rankings—a rank only two places below China (82) and 
well above other democracies with large pastoral-nomadic communities such as Kenya (124), India (131), 
Nepal (136), Pakistan (143), Afghanistan (156), and Tanzania (157).  
 
Rural herders use their phones to access commodity price information and weather forecasts 
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012; Hay, 2014) as well as to access medical services (World Bank, 2014), 
receive storm warnings (Hahn, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2016), and find educational information (UNICEF, 2013). 
The World Bank, the Dutch government, and Xac Bank (Mongolia) have offered microloans for training and 
installation of solar panels throughout Mongolia. By 2014, more than 100,146 solar panels had been installed 
throughout Mongolia (Hay, 2014), allowing rural herders to charge their phones far from the electrical grid. 
 
Mongolia’s quickly expanding ICT infrastructure has enabled a break with Soviet media theory, 
giving control of the infrastructure to private ICT suppliers and resulting in bidirectional engagements 
between citizens and the government. The use of cell phones enables the government to send information 
to rural citizens and enables citizens to send requests or demands back to the government. Mongolia’s 
development of bidirectional communicative networks is unique and remarkable among post-Soviet and 
Central Asian nations, which tend to concentrate political power and discourage public discourse (Fish, 
2001). Many post-Soviet nations expanded their ICT networks, but, as Vanderhill (2015) notes, an open 
ICT network when coupled with an authoritarian government does not result in democratization. Mongolia 
stands out as a post-Soviet democracy that uses ICT networks to create programs such as the “11-11” 
program, a phone line developed in 2012 for citizens to call and express their opinions (Geismar, 2015). 
Additionally, between 2013 and 2014, the mayor of Ulaanbaatar called for three SMS referenda on the issues 
of car regulation and recycling (Dierkes, 2015; Zoljargal, 2013). The success of these city-based referenda 
was used as preparation for the 2015 national referendum via text messaging.  
 




Mongolians date their independence from China to 1911, when Chinese officials were driven out of 
the country and a group of Mongolian lords and lamas declared independence from the Qing Empire. 
However, a series of Russian and Chinese treaties brought this sovereignty into question (Mansvetov, 1945). 
For example, “while the 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty gave China sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, the Soviets 
didn’t actually agree to remove their troops from Mongolia” (Baabar, 1999, p. 257). This political stalemate 
continued throughout World War II, and China renewed its attempts to reclaim Mongolia in 1945. It is for 
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these reasons that the Yalta Agreement specifically recognized Outer Mongolia. Although Chiang Kai-shek 
was reluctant to accept this portion of the Yalta Agreement, he agreed to do so “after a face-saving formula 
of a Mongolian referendum” (Haining, 1991, p. 38). Today, Mongolians mark the 1945 referendum as their 
first democratic vote (Amarsaikhan, 2015). Investigating this referendum not only provides a window into 
the development of Mongolian political participation but also creates a baseline from which to understand 
the successes and failures of the 2015 referendum.  
 
For a month before the 1945 vote, the Mongolian-Soviet referendum committee organized local 
commissions in all districts of Mongolia. Seminars and meetings were held with local commissioners, the 
Socialist Party, the Revolutionary Youth, women’s groups, and union groups. Men and women over age 18 
were eligible to vote (“Mongolian Plebiscite Begins,” 1945), and both nomadic and settled Mongolians were 
encouraged to participate (Pravda, 1945b, p.4). It is estimated that 60,000 Mongolians participated in these 
voter education sessions (Ivanov & Prikhodov, 1945, para. 19). One thousand polling places were 
established throughout Mongolia, allowing rural and urban participation (“Mongol City Votes Freedom,” 
1945). A report sent to the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs by the Soviet ambassador to the Mongolian 
People’s Republic (MPR), I. A. Ivanov, and the advisor to the Mongolian Communist Party, Prikhodov, 
summarizes the success and failures of these preparations in the MPR.  
 
Many of the polling stations witnessed spontaneous mass demonstrations, and the voters 
arrived at the stations with flags, banners, and portraits of comrade Stalin and the leaders 
of the MPR. After the voting many bagas [neighborhoods] and soums [districts] witnessed 
spontaneous people’s festivities, which saw horse racing, archery and wrestling 
competitions, etc. The best horses and horsemen were selected to deliver the results of 
the voting to soums [districts] and aimags [provinces]. The delivery of the voting registers 
was considered to be an honored task and every messenger considered it a matter of 
honor to arrive earlier than the others. (Ivanov & Prikhodov, 1945, para. 26) 
 
Li Fazhang, deputy internal minister of China, was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to observe the referendum vote 
(Batbayar, n.d.). Fazhang’s committee, which had sent observers to both rural and urban voting locations, 
indicated approval of the results. This led to Chang Kai-shek’s formal acceptance of the referendum and 
Mongolian independence as an autonomous satellite state of the Soviet Union. Speaking with a reporter, 
Fazhang said, “After this plebiscite, Mongolia’s status will finally be legally formalized. I’m very pleased” 
(Pravda, 1945c, p. 4).  
 
Although the referendum was accepted as valid, reporters and scholars have grappled with voting 
irregularities. Pravda, the official paper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, gave glowing reports 
of voter participation. However, international press coverage and government reports such as those filed by 
Ivanov and Prikhodov give a more complex view of voter participation. “There were cases of eyewashing, 
when local commissions, desiring to show their ‘good’ work, without asking the voters, marked their opinions 
in the voting lists and even faked signatures to prove the ‘hundred percent’ participation of the voters in the 
plebiscite” (Ivanov & Prikhodov, 1945, para. 29). The New York Times asserted that the “results of such 
plebiscites, conducted under Russian auspices, are forgone conclusions. This referendum differed from most 
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others held in disputed territory only in being absolutely unanimous” (“One-Way Vote in Mongolia,” 1945, 
p.18). Baabar (1999), a Mongolian historian, writes: 
 
Voters had to sign either the word “approve” or the word “refrain” printed onto the ballot 
papers, or else put one’s finger print on either of the two, which required supervision. The 
staging of such a political farce greatly tarnished the substance and the essence of the 
referendum. (p. 412)  
 
Despite these irregularities, the 1945 referendum ensured Mongolia’s independence. Later, the 
1950 Sino-Soviet treaty “affirm[ed] complete guarantee of the independent status of the Mongolian People’s 
Republic as a result of the referendum of 1945” (Ballis, 1951, p. 176). For many post–World War II Chinese 
and Soviet officials, the Mongolian referendum was the one topic on which they were willing to agree 
(Atkinson, 1947).  
 
Participation in the 1945 Referendum 
 
Few reports of the 1945 referendum provide detailed accounts of citizen participation. One example 
that goes beyond the general reports of national excitement and unity is a field report that was published 
in Pravda on October 22, 1945. It provides representative quotes from a retired person, a worker, a poet, 
and a professor. For example, a 63-year-old retired Mongolian is quoted saying, “What happy faces everyone 
had today! I along with everyone, am happy” (Pravda, 1945a, p.4). A few days later, Pravda (1945c) 
reported that the referendum indicated citizens’ devotion to independent Mongolia. It is important to note 
that quotes included in Pravda were selected and approved by government propaganda officers, who were 
unlikely to select unflattering quotations. They are cited here because they are among the few reports of 




Although Mongolia began holding democratic elections in 1992, the country did not hold another 
national referendum until 2015. This gap in the use of referenda can be attributed to many factors, including 
socialist policy making, a reliance on Soviet political advisors, and increasing centralization of Mongolia’s 
government during the socialist period of 1924–1990. When Mongolia transitioned to democracy in 1990, 
there were calls for referenda. For example, O. Dashbalbar’s (2008) 1990 speech to parliament, “A 
Referendum,” calls for a vote on foreign ownership of Mongolian lands. While a referendum was not held at 
the time, a provision for referenda was included in Mongolia’s 1992 democratic constitution, paving the way 
for the 2015 vote. It should be noted, however, that the 2015 referendum was neither constitutionally nor 
legally binding. Rather, it was a question posed to the public by the government.  
 
The Mongolian political milieu of 2015 was much different than that of 1945. The 1945 referendum 
was held among a citizenry who were largely illiterate, unaccustomed to voting, and facing numerous 
political upheavals. Contemporary Mongolia’s 97.5% literacy rate, peaceful transition to democracy in 1990, 
improving economy, and expansive digital communicative network set the foundation for high rates of 
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political participation, even among the most rural of citizens. But reliance on the ICT infrastructure also may 
have caused politicians to overlook the value of public voter education used in 1945. 
 
The 2015 referendum was called in response to national conflicts over mining rights, herding 
spaces, and landownership of the Oyu Tolgoi mine located in the south Gobi Desert. L. Bold (2014), 
Mongolia’s minister of foreign affairs (2012–2014), has described this issue as “so hotly debated because it 
was our very first strategic business agreement with a multinational corporation” (para. 6). While Bold 
signaled openness to mining, other Mongolians argued that the country must stop mining and deliberate 
before committing to future mining contracts. The resulting argumentative clash raised questions about who 
has the right to speak, protest, and sign mining contracts in Mongolia (Bulag, 2009; Jackson, 2014; Suzuki, 
2013). The 2015 referendum responded to these questions by asking all citizens to vote on the status of 
the Oyu Tolgoi contract. In January 2015, Saikhanbileg announced a four-day-long referendum by SMS that 
would ask Mongolians whether they preferred foreign direct investment at Oyu Tolgoi or a period of austerity. 
In conducting this poll, government officials stood to gain significant political capital by both proving that 
citizens support mining and indicating a willingness to listen to their constituents (Dierkes, 2015).  
 
When the 2015 referendum by SMS was announced, Mongolian government officials and media 
spokespeople were careful to specify that the referendum was neither politically nor legally binding and that 
it was intended only as a way for the public to express their opinion about mining policy. Yet national and 
international observers framed Mongolia’s 2015 referendum as a legitimate vote, providing fodder for both 
citizen deliberation among those who were prepared for a vote and those who understood the referendum 
as the beginning (not end) of political deliberation. These multiple starting points for deliberation about the 
Oyu Tolgoi contract are evidence of a situation of dissensus (Zarefsky, 2009). The referendum did not 
solidify public opinion. Yet, by holding the vote, Mongolia may have produced a test case for understanding 
how mobile technologies might encourage more comprehensive political participation among both pastoral-




The 2015 referendum occurred over a four-day period, between January 31 and February 3, 
2015, when every cell phone number, except for very recently acquired numbers, received one vote that 
could be sent free of charge. The referendum question, as translated by the University College London 
(Geismar, 2015) stated: 
 
Together let’s choose our pathway of development for Mongolia 2015–2016: 
 
1.  Set the price [meaning to reverse the depreciation of the Mongolian currency, the 
tugrik, or MNT, and rising inflation] by deciding on Oyu Tolgoi [a copper and gold 
mine] and other big construction projects. 
2.  Set the price by reducing our spending and consumption, and discipline the 
economy. 
 
Please send the number in front of your response to 15151111.  
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Announcing the referendum on national television, Saikhanbileg stated: 
 
I think it is not [a] bad thing to ask the public about solving problems. The people are 
actually the decision-makers. They vote and choose the members of government and 
parliament. There is no wrong thing to ask the public once. I want the public to be very 
active on this poll and the economists must hear their views. If this measure really 
works successfully, I am ready to give the plan of works that shows a list of measures 
to be taken through the first or second options. I hope it will help to solve the problem, 
and will ease the issues for MPs to make their decisions. (cited in Onorzul, 
Purevsambuu, Khuder, & Amarsaihan, 2015, para. 59)  
 
Saikhanbileg’s statement indicates an openness to debate and citizen participation. However, as 
Mohammed (2016) argues, public political arguments such as Saikhanbileg’s have multiple goals, both 
individualistic and collective (p. 228). Mongolian and international analysts identified Saikhanbileg’s 
collectivist goals in calling for a referendum as an attempt to engage voters (Barradas, 2015) and to 
demonstrate that the government was reaching out to Mongolian citizens (Dierkes, 2015). Other scholars 
suggested that Saikhanbileg had individual goals in calling for the referendum, such as demonstrating 
political capital (Wilson & Hornby, 2015), decentralizing responsibility for a (potentially failing) mining 
policy (Batbileg, 2015; Geismar, 2015), and increasing international investor confidence (Edwards, 
2015a). 
 
Although the vote was sent to 3 million SIM cards, only 356,841 votes were cast and 302,008 
votes counted. Just over 56% of voters were in support of option one—signing the Oyu Tolgoi contract. 
Some scholars and commentators attributed the low participation rate to a poorly phrased question; 
others deplored the lack of mutual exclusivity between the voting options (Dierkes, 2015; Geismar, 
2015; Tsenddoo, 2015) or explained that the second option actually constituted a threat of national and 
financial ruin (Geismar, 2015). Unlike the 1945 referendum, for which we are reliant on government 
and scholarly reports to understand the perspective of citizens, there is a large body of comments from 
citizens who participated in the 2015 referendum. 
 
The next section presents an analysis of the ways that Mongolians debated the merits of both 
holding a referendum via SMS and the specific 2015 referendum question. This analysis draws from 
tweets marked with either the hashtag #15151111 (the phone number to which voters were to text 
their vote) or #саналасуулга (the Mongolian word for “referendum,” “survey,” or “poll”), which were 
posted between January 29 and February 4, 2015. Location data posted by tweeters indicates that online 
discussants are from across Mongolia and represent both urban and rural citizens. Utilizing close reading 
and cluster analysis, I have identified four argumentative clusters among these tweets: (a) support for 
the referendum, (b) calls for a third option, (c) satire, and (d) rejection of the referendum. 
 
Support for the Referendum 
 
Many Mongolians supported the referendum and worked to ensure that citizens were engaged 
in the vote. Some tweeted screenshots of their vote for option 1 (OBT, 2015). Others, such as Shagi 
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(2015), voiced support for option two, by tweeting “1. Not working, MNT goes up 2. IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] healing, MNT goes down let’s select #2 #PM #15151111.” These tweets were commonly 
short and posted by individuals who included information about their mining-sector, government, or 
advocacy jobs in their Twitter profile.  
 
Calls for a Third Option 
 
When he announced the referendum, Saikhanbileg indicated that “there is no third option” (City 
Hall of Mongolia, 2015). Yet several Mongolians criticized the referendum for either providing non-
mutually exclusive options or not presenting a third option. Tweeters such as Deni G. (2015) and 
Batjargal (2015) suggested that voters should choose both options one and two. Others suggested 
voting between the options, such as texting 1.5 (Zuulaakk, 2015) or refusing to vote because neither 
option was satisfactory (Jambaldorj, 2015). The computer program used to tabulate referendum votes 
was designed to cancel any vote that reported a number other than 1 or 2, so votes for 1.5 and 3 were 
not counted in the final tally. This may partially account for why 356,841 votes were cast but only 




Not all tweeters directly engaged the referendum topic. A comparison picked up by the 
international press was between the referendum and the television program The X Factor (Baika, 2015)—
the allegation being that the vote was a mere popularity contest. Others tweeters rephrased both options 
and warned other voters that neither option was correct (Baatulga, 2015; Dayaderrkh, 2015). Other 
satirical posts demonstrated the highest level of social media acumen, utilizing memes or clever verbal 
twists along with photographs (Marzan, 2015). As many satirists only posted once using the hashtags 
identified by this study, it is difficult to determine whether their satire was an attempt to avoid entering 
deliberation or was a reflection of long-term deliberation regarding the Oyu Tolgoi contract.  
 
Rejection of the Referendum 
 
Finally, a group of tweeters specifically rejected the 2015 referendum. This rejection was 
specific to the 2015 vote, not the method of SMS referendum. An example is ErikF’s (2015) tweet, 
posted on February 2, 2015, two days into the voting period: “Saikhanbileg surveys 3 million people, 
160,000 answered, 90% of citizens resisted. This was a stupid question.” Similarly, a commenter 
responding to Geismar’s (2015) online report of the referendum wrote that the “majority of public did 
not respond because the poll itself was followed with scare tactic, [do] not choose No. 1 [because there 
is a] possibility the public will more suffer” (Tsogt, 2015, para. 1).  
 
Other commentators called for politicians to reject the referendum’s outcome. This rejection 
was based on the possibility that foreigners and teenagers were casting votes, which led to the 
perception of illegality or fraud in the vote (Namkhaijantsan, 2015). And some tweeters questioned 
whether the referendum itself was legal, though they did not specify the cause of their doubt 
(Dashzebeg, 2015; Unurbayar, 2015).  
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Domestic and International Media Reports 
 
Results from the 2015 referendum were announced through national and international media 
channels and were received differently by the Mongolian and international public. The Mongolian media 
proclaimed the vote to be a “flop,” and reporters emphasized the low voter turnout and the small margin of 
error between votes for options one and two (Graubner, 2015). Some international news agencies agreed 
with this interpretation. For example, Oman Daily Observer (2015) reported that “netizens ridiculed the 
exercise, decrying the poll as a ‘sham’ and an ‘obvious attempt by the government to divert liability.’” (para. 
5). Keen (2015), a reporter for Mineweb, suggested that the 12% gap between voters supporting options 
one and two was not a disaster, but it did indicate the need for caution among investors. 
 
Reports written for an international audience with an emphasis on mining took a different angle. 
In these publications, the vote was reframed as proof that Mongolians support international mining. For 
example, in an interview with Reuters, B. Anhbayar, the Mongolian Investment Group chief executive officer, 
indicated that Mongolia was about to approve the Oyu Tolgoi contract (Edwards, 2015b). And Mining.com, 
an online mining journal, ran an article titled “Mongolian Text Poll Impact: Dust Off Your Exploration Plans” 
(Els, 2015, para. 1). The International Business Times similarly reported that the vote gave Saikhanbileg a 
mandate to negotiate the mining contract (Neicho, 2015). Bloomberg News interviewed Dale Choi, head of 
Independent Mongolian Metals and Mining Research, who stated, “I give [the prime minister] credit for going 
to the public because the one thing that all these people will listen to is the public opinion” (Kohn, 2015, 
para. 10).  
 
This misalignment of national and international reporting could have significant impacts for 
Mongolia. Following the 2015 referendum, Saikhanbileg proceeded as if he had the political capital to finalize 
a contract with Oyu Tolgoi. Zarefsky (1992) argues that it is risky to interpret election outcomes as ending 
a debate and establishing a political mandate, and this risk seems to have been played out in Mongolia. 
While Saikhanbileg interpreted the referendum as an end point of political discussion regarding the Oyu 
Tolgoi contract, for many citizens, such as those who responded to the referendum on Twitter, it may have 
been just the beginning or an interesting waypoint in the deliberation.  
 
Lessons From Mongolia’s 1945 and 2015 Referenda 
 
By calling for a referendum in 2015, Mongolian politicians (perhaps unintentionally) pressed the 
limits of Soviet media theory and explored the use of two-way direct communication between citizens and 
the state. Cellular and online deliberation cannot replace traditional networks such as the neg nutgiinkhan, 
but they do utilize a public screen to facilitate public political argument among distant communities that 
were previously unconnected. Whereas in 1945, the Mongolian government provided education for citizens 
followed by a mandatory unanimous vote, the 2015 referendum occurred quickly, with little preparation or 
time for citizen deliberation. This lack of time for deliberation before the vote may explain why voter 
participation was low and the margin of success was minimal. Yet, following Zarefsky’s (2009) assessment 
of diverse and undecided publics, we can see that low voter turnout might not have indicated a lack of 
interest, but rather that voters were not yet ready to conclude the debate over an Oyu Tolgoi contract. The 
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diversity of tweets posted during the voting period does, however, indicate that voters were ready to engage 
in deliberation. 
 
As Mohammed (2016) has argued, public political arguments are multipurposive activity types. 
This diversity is seen in the 1945 referendum, which confirmed Mongolia’s independence as a Soviet-satellite 
state and smoothed relations between China and the Soviet Union. This event was neither designed nor did 
it serve to facilitate formal public political deliberation among the Mongolian public. The 2015 referendum 
offered a similar diversity of goals, from easing tensions with foreign mining corporations to (attempting) 
to provide political capital for Prime Minister Saikhanbileg’s economic agenda. Both events also had 
unintentional, long-term implications. Although the 1945 referendum was not designed to facilitate rural 
public deliberation, a report of the event and accompanying images of herders at polling places is commonly 
found in Mongolian schoolbooks, functioning as a touchstone for democratic voting. A similar touchstone 
was established by the 2015 SMS referendum, which proved to even the most rural citizens that the national 
government can directly engage rural and mobile populations. As a herder interviewed by Tencic (2015) 
describes,  
 
If you are receiving a message on your mobile phone from the municipality, this sort of a 
buzz makes you feel good that your municipality is making an inquiry from you personally, 
so this can drive you to respond. People get inspired, they really think their voices can 
reach the government and something can take place. (para. 18) 
 
Additionally, the 2015 referendum encouraged citizens to turn to other social media platforms such as 
Twitter to engage other citizens, expanding communicative networks via public screen deliberations. By 
holding a referendum via SMS, the Mongolian government may have set new a precedent for public political 
argument and voting. In January 2016, the Mongolian parliament announced that it was working on a law 
on public referenda. The drafted law would put any issue that had not been resolved after three 
parliamentary sessions to a public referendum (Khuder, 2016). Through these developments, Mongolia is 
setting an example for political discourse among mobile and rural populations. Nations from Kenya to 
Kyrgyzstan, may find Mongolia’s experiment informative for their own use of digital screens to encourage 
public deliberation. SMS referenda, which encourage new deliberative networks and utilize ICTs that are 
already in the hands of rural citizens, may provide pathways to political engagement previously reserved 
for rich and urban citizens. From herders’ and social media users’ statements, it is evident that even if the 
2015 referendum was a flop, the experience will have a long-lasting impact on public political discourse in 










4392  Allison Hahn International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
References 
 
Adas, M. (1989). Machines as the measure of men: Science, technology and ideologies of Western 
dominance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Aimer, P., & Miller, R. (2002). Partisanship and principle: Voters and the New Zealand electoral 
referendum of 1993. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 795–809.  
 
Amarsaikhan, B. (2015, October 19). Scientific conference runs on 70th anniversary of public referendum. 
Montsame News Agency. Retrieved from http://en.montsame.mn/politics/scientific-conference-
runs-70th-anniversary-public-referendum 
 
Atkinson, G. W. (1947). Sino Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance. International Affairs, 23(3),  
357–366.  
 
Baabar. (1999). History of Mongolia (D. Suhjargalmaa, S. Burenbayar, H. Hulan, & N. Tuya, Trans.). 
Cambridge, UK: White Horse Press. 
 
Baatulga, T. [Battulga]. (2015, February 4). 1. Улсаа худалдаж эдийн засгаа аврах уу 2. Таныг 
золиослож эдийн засгийн аврах уу гэсэн санал асуулга явуулжээ [1. Buy your country to save 
your economy 2. Questionnaire for saving and saving economy] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/battulgat/status/562809479595843584  
 
Baika, P. [baikap]. (2015, January 30). @FinancialTimes Сайханбилэгийн санал асуулгыг ТВ-ын X Factor 
шоутай төстэй санал асуулга хэмээн зүйрлүүлсэн байна [Saikhanbileg’s polls are comparable 
to the X Factor TV show] #15151111 [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://mobile.twitter.com/baikap?p=s  
 
Ballis, W. B. (1951). The pattern of Sino-Soviet treaties, 1945–1950. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 277, 167–176. 
 
Barradas, C. (2015, February 5). Mongolia votes in SMS referendum. Frontiers Capital. Retrieved from 
http://www.frontiers-capital.com/2015/02/05/mongolia-votes-sms-referendum/  
 
Batbayar, Ts. (n.d.). Mongolia’s national referendum for independence. End of Empire: Asia. Retrieved 
from http://www.endofempire.asia/1020-1-mongolias-national-referendum-for-independence-3/  
 
Batbileg, Kh. [Batbilegh_Mind]. (2015, January 30). Үнэндээ бол бид санал асуулга өгөхгүй байсан ч 
ард түмэн сонгосон гээд бодлогоо үргэлжлүүлэх байх . . . Хариуцлагаас мултарч, ам барих 
санаа . . . #РТ [In fact, we have a poll but not the people who have chosen it, They have to 
continue the policy . . . Accountability] [Tweet]. Retrieved January 31, 2016 from 
https://mobile.twitter.com/Batbilegkh_Mind?p=s (link has been removed since its retrieval) 
 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  Mongolia’s 2015 Referendum  4393 
Batjargal, Kh. (2015, January 31). ЗГ-ийн 15151111 руу хариултыг хэлж болохнээдээ [You can reply to 
the government] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/batjaakh/status/561576178931093504  
 
Bijker, W. B. (2006). Why and how technology matters. In R. E. Goodin & C. Tilly (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of contextual political analysis (pp. 681–706). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 




Bulag, U. (2009). Mongolia in 2008: From Mongolia to Mine-golia. Asian Survey, 49(1), 129–134. 
 
Burnap, P., Gibson, R., Sloan, L., Southern, R., & William, M. (2015). 140 characters to victory? Using 
Twitter to predict the UK 2015 general election, Electoral Studies, 41, 230–233.  
 
City Hall of Mongolia. (2015, January 31). Бүх нийтийн хэлэлцүүлэг ->15151111 [Public discussion] 
[Tweet]. Retrieved from http://dd.cityhall.gov.mn/2015/01/referendum.html  
 
Communications Regulatory Commission of Mongolia. (2016, May 16). Main indicators of ICT sector 2015 
year. Retrieved from http://crc.gov.mn/en/k/S/11  
 
Dalaibuyan, B. (2013). A network approach to NGO development: Women’s NGOs in Mongolia. 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 15(1). Retrieved from 
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol15iss1/art_4.htm  
 
Dashbalbar, O. (2008). The battle for our land has begun: Poems and political writings 1990–1999  
(S. Wickham-Smith, Trans.). Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Dashbalbar Foundation. 
 
Dashzebeg, G. [sudlaachganaa]. (2015, January 29). Энэ удаагийн асуулга хууль зүйн ямар ч үндэслэл 
байхгүй. Ард нийтийн санал асуулгын хууль гэж б/г. Үүнээс өөрөөр бол утгагүй, юу ч биш 
болно [This questionnaire is legal, or there is no justification for it. Public feedback is as a 
questionnaire asks A or B. Otherwise, it is pointless and meaningless] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://mobile.twitter.com/sudlaachganaa?p=s  
 
Dayaderrkh [ochirkhuyagm]. (2015, January 15). Санал асуулга; 1. Та - унтаж байгаад босоод ажилдаа 
явдаг 2. Та - босоод ажилдаа явж ирээд Унтдаг [Survey; 1. You go to work while asleep, 2. You 
go to work and sleep] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://mobile.twitter.com/ochirkhuyagm?p=s  
 
DeLuca, K., Lawson, S., & Sun, Y. (2012). Occupy Wall Street on the public screens of social media: The 
many framings of the birth of a protest movement. Communication, Culture and Critique, 5,  
483–509. 
 
4394  Allison Hahn International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
DeLuca, K., & Peeples, J. (2002). From public sphere to public screen: Democracy, activism, and the 
“violence” of Seattle. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 19(2), 125–151. 
 
Deni G. (2015, January 31). Энэ санал асуулга аваад байгаа 15151111 нь 1 ба 2 хамтд нь сонгох 
хувилбаргvймаа янз нь: ууг нь ЭЗ-аа ч эрчимжvvлээд зардалаа ч танамаар мэт [This 
questionnaire 15151111 is a joint 1 and 2. There are different ways to choose your options: It’s 
like the EZ, and it costs you money] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/Denziana/status/561726531165114368  
 
de Vreese, C. H., & Semetko, H. A. (2004). News matters: Influences on the vote in a referendum 
campaign. European Journal of Political Research, 43, 701–724. 
 
Diener, A. (2011). Will new mobilities beget new (im)mobilities? Prospects for change resulting from 
Mongolia’s trans-state highway. In S. D. Brunn (Ed.), Engineering Earth (pp. 627–641). New 
York, NY: Springer Science + Business Media.  
 
Dierkes, J. (2015, January 30). Digital democracy: PM Saikhanbileg’s policy choice SMS poll [Web log 
post]. Mongolia Focus. Retrieved from http://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2015/digital-democracy-
policy-choice-sms-poll/  
 
Edwards, T. (2015a, February 5). Mongolia looks at equity for royalties swap to break mining deadlock. 
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/mongolia-investment-
mining-idUSL4N0VF7J620150206  
 
Edwards, T. (2015b, February 3). Mongolia “text referendum” could help resolve investment impasse. 
Reuters. Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/mongolia-investment-
idUKL4N0VD46Y20150203  
 
Els, F. (2015, February 5). Mongolia text poll impact: Dust off your exploration plans. Mining.com. 
Retrieved from http://www.mining.com/mongolian-65578/  
 
Enkhtuvshin, B. (n.d.). New challenges for nomadic civilization and pastoral nomadism in Mongolia. 
Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.112.488&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
 
ErikF [d_erkad]. (2015, February 2). Сайханбилэг санал асуулга 3 сая дугаарт очоод 160000 хариу 
өгсөн байна тэгэхээр иргэдийн 90% 2 тэнэг асуултыг нь эсэргүүцлээ гэсэн үг биз дэ 
[Saikhanbileg surveys 3 million people, 160,000 answered, 90% of citizens resisted. This was a 
stupid question] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/d_erkad/status/562267051633299458  
 
Fish, M. S. (2001). The Inner Asian anomaly: Mongolia’s democratization in comparative perspective. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 34, 323–338. 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  Mongolia’s 2015 Referendum  4395 
Fossum, J. E., & Menéndez, A. J. (2005). The constitution’s gift? A deliberative democratic analysis of 
constitution making in the European Union. European Law Journal, 11, 380–410. 
 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. (2012). Asian media barometer: Mongolia 2012. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Author. 
Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/asia-media/10293.pdf  
 
Gastil, J. (2008). Political communication and deliberation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Geismar, H. (2015, February 23). Digital politics in Mongolia [Web log post]. Material World: Notes From 
the Field. Retrieved from http://www.materialworldblog.com/2015/02/digital-politics-in-
mongolia/  
 
Ginsburg, T. (1995). Political reform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China. Asian Survey, 35(5),  
459–471.  
 
Graubner, C. (2015, March 12). The Mongolian mining referendum: Extractive resource policy via SMS 
poll. Ulula. Retrieved from http://ulula.com/the-mongolian-mining-referendum-extractive-
resource-policy-via-sms-poll/  
 
Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. F. (2004). Why deliberative democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Hahn, A. (2017). Complexity of Mongolian stakeholders’ dzud preparation and response. Natural Hazards, 
 1–17.  Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-017-2907-2  
 
Haining, T. N. (1991). Between the Kremlin and the Forbidden City. In A. Akiner (Ed.), Mongolia today 
(pp. 32–57). New York, NY: Kegan Paul International. 
 
Harutyunyan, N. (2014, March 10). Armenia: Communities have their say via SMS polling. UNDP Armenia. 




Hay, M. (2014). Nomads on the grid. Slate. Retrieved from 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/roads/2014/12/mongolian_nomads_ambitious  
 
Høigilt, J., Falch, Å., & Rolandsen, Ø. H. (2010). The Sudan referendum and neighboring countries: Egypt 
and Uganda. Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo. 
 
Huberty, M. (2014). Can we vote with our tweet? On the perennial difficulty of election forecasting with 
social media. International Journal of Forecasting, 31(1), 992–1007. 
 
4396  Allison Hahn International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
Husky, E., & Hill, D. (2011). The 2010 referendum and parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. Electoral 
Studies, 30(4), 876–879.  
 
Ivanov and Prikhodov report on the Mongolian referendum. (1945, November 22). Wilson Center History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. Retrieved from 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122625  
 
Jackson, S. L. (2014). Imagining the mineral nation: Contested nation building in Mongolia. Nationalities 
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 43(3), 437–456. 
 
Jambaldorj, T. [tanajambaldorj]. (2015, January 28). 2 сонголтын аль нь хэрэгтэй, 1-ийг хэрэгжих 
хооронд богино хугацаанд сахилга бат, хяналтгүй хямралаас гарахгүй л дээ #15151111 
[More than 2 options are needed. No one is out of line, and this is not an uncontrolled crisis. # 
15151111] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/tanajambaldorj/status/560441786506543104  
 
Jargalsaikhan, M. (2012). Civil society in a non-Western setting: Mongolian civil society. Vancouver, 
Canada: University of British Columbia. 
 
Keen, K. (2015, February 4). No victors in Mongolia’s text vote on mining. Mineweb. Retrieved  from 
https://zw.newshub.org/no-victors-mongolia-s-text-vote-mining-11028015.html#  
 
Khuder, B. (2016, January 14). New version of law on public referendum submitted. Montsame. Retrieved 
from http://en.montsame.mn/politics/new-version-law-public-referendum-submitted  
 




Lea, J. (2006). The Prince Edward Island plebiscite on electoral reform. Canadian Parliamentary Review, 4, 
4–8. 
 
Ledeneva, A. (2008). Blat and guanxi: Informal practices in Russia and China. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 50(1), 118–144.  
 
Mansvetov, F. S. (1945). Russia and China in Outer Mongolia. Foreign Affiars, 24, 143–152. 
 
Мarzan, A. [Mr. Sharav]. (2015, January 31). Шийдлийн Засгийн газрын санал асуулга. 1. Түрэхүү?  
2. Чирэх үү? pic.twitter.com/iwdCHDYmse [The solution to the government’s survey. 1. Pushing? 
2. Pulling?] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/mrsharav/status/561789622045265921  
 
McBride, C. (2005). Deliberative democracy and the politics of recognition. Political Studies, 53, 479–515.  
 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  Mongolia’s 2015 Referendum  4397 
Mercy Corps. (2016). SMS training for rural citizens. Retrieved from 
http://mercycorps.org.mn/beta/index.php/en/news-mcm/656-sms-training-for-rural-citizens  
 
Mohammed, D. (2016). Goals in argumentation: A proposal for the analysis and evaluation of public 
political argument. Argumentation, 30, 221–245.  
 
Mongol city votes freedom: 24,638–0. (1945, October 23). The New York Times, p 1. 
 
Mongolian plebiscite begins. (1945, October 21). The New York Times, p. 3. 
 
Mumford, L. (1963). Technics and civilization. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. 
 
Myagmar, M. (2001). Transformation of Mongolian electronic media: Prospects of public broadcasting in a 
dual system. Center for Policy Studies/Open Society Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.policy.hu/myagmar/research_paper.PDF  
 
Namkhaijantsan, D. (2015, March 24). Have your say via SMS: Mongolia’s mobile users choose industry 




Na’puti, T. R., & Hahn, A. H. (2013). Plebiscite deliberations: Self-determination and deliberative 
democracy in Guam. Journal of Public Deliberation, 9(2), 11. 
 
Neicho, J. (2015, July 9). How Mongolia’s rollercoaster economy could be about to take off. International 
Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/how-mongolias-rollercoaster-economy-
could-be-about-take-off-1510147  
 
OBT [otgonbat_sh]. (2015, January 30). 15151111-д саналаа өгөв. Ирсэн хариу нь энэ. [Voted. Here is 
my answer] [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/otgonbat_sh/status/5613580156310896661of11/28/17  
 
Oleinik, A. (2012). Institutional exclusion as a destabilizing factor: The mass unrest of July 1, 2008 in 
Mongolia. Central Asian Survey, 31(2), 153–174. 
 
Oman Daily Observer (2015, February 5). Mongolians SMS vote for foreign investment. Oman Daily 
Observer. Retrieved from http://www.pressreader.com/oman/oman-daily-
observer/20150205/282230894110757  
 
One-way vote in Mongolia. (1945, October 26). The New York Times, p. 18.  
 
4398  Allison Hahn International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
Onorzul, M., Purevsambuu, G., Khuder, B., & Amarsaihan, B. (2015, January 29). PM: Time for Mongolia 
to shift from a welfare economy to a productive economy. Cover Mongolia. Retrieved from 
http://covermongolia.blogspot.com/2015/01/mnt-settles-down-for-now-pm-seeks-shift.html  
 
Pfister, D., & Godana, G. D. (2012). Deliberation technology. Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(1), art. 10. 
 




Pravda. (1945a, October 22). Плебисцит в МОНГОЛЬСКОЙ Народной Республике: Итоги голосования в 
Улан-Баторе [Plebiscite in the Mongolian People’s Republic: The results of voting in Ulaanbaatar]. 
No. 253.10024. 
 
Pravda. (1945b, October 22). Протокол о результатах проведения плебисцита по вопросу о 
независимости Монгольской Народной Республика [The protocol for the results of the plebiscite 
on the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic]. No. 276.10049, p. 4. 
 
Pravda. (1945c, October 26). Заявление представителя китайского правительства о плебисците в 
Монгольской Народной Республике [Statement by the representative of the Chinese 
government on the plebiscite in the Mongolian People’s Republic]. No. 255.10026, p. 4. 
 
Qvortrup, M. (2006). Democracy by delegation: The decision to hold referendums in the United Kingdom. 
Direct Democracy and Representation, 42, 59–72. 
 
Rossabi, M. (2005). Modern Mongolia: From khans to commissars to capitalists. Oakland, CA: University of 
California Press.  
 
Sabloff, P. (2002). Why Mongolia? The political culture of an emerging democracy. Central Asian Survey, 
21(1), 19–36. 
 
Sabloff, P. (2013). Does everyone want democracy? Insights from Mongolia. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast 
Press. 
 
Shagi [mnshagai]. (2015, January 28). 1. Not working, MNT goes up 2. IMF [International Monetary Fund] 
healing, MNT goes down let’s select #2 #PM #15151111 [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/mnshagai/status/560445198002421764  
 
Siebert, F., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1963). Four theories of the press: The authoritarian, libertarian, 
social responsibility, and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do. Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press. 
 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  Mongolia’s 2015 Referendum  4399 
Soni, S. (2004). Democracy at work: Parliamentary elections in Mongolia. Himalayan and Central Asian 
Studies, 8(2/3), 100–120. 
 
Susanto, T. D., & Goodwin, R. (2013). User acceptance of SMS-based e-government services: Differences 
between adopters and non-adopters. Government Information Quarterly, 30, 486–497. 
 
Suzuki, Y. (2013). Conflict between mining development and nomadism in Mongolia. In N. Yamamura,  
N. Fujita, & A. Maekawa (Eds.), The Mongolian ecosystem network (pp. 269–294). Tokyo, Japan: 
Springer Japan. 
 
Tencic, N. (2015, February 5). Mongolia “approves foreign investment” in SMS referendum. ABC News 
Australia. Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-05/mongolia-approves-foreign-
investment-in-sms-referendum2c-point/6071276  
 
Tosgt, O. (2015, February 24). Digital politics in Mongolia [Blog Comment]. Retrieved from 
http://www.materialworldblog.com/2015/02/digital-politics-in-mongolia/  
 
Tsenddoo, B. (2015, January 29). 1-ийг сонгох уу, 2-ыг сонгох уу? Хамаагүй ээ! [Choose No. 1 or 
choose No. 2? It doesn’t matter!]. Baabar.mn. Retrieved from 
http://www.baabar.mn/content/6726.shtml    
 
UNICEF. (2013). UNICEF annual report 2013—Mongolia. Retrieved from 
http://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Mongolia_COAR_2013.pdf  
 
Unurbayar, G. [UnurbayarG]. (2015, January 15). Ард нийтийн санал асуулгын тухай хуулийг зөрчиж 
байгаа. Сайханбилэгт УИХ-ын зөвшөөрөлгүй ийм санал асуулга явуулах эрхгүй [The 
referendum is illegal. Saikhanbileg is not entitled to conduct such polls without a parliamentary 
approval] [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://mobile.twitter.com/UnurbayarG?p=s  
 
Vanderhill, R. (2015). Limits on the democratizing influence of the Internet: Lessons from post-Soviet 
states. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 23(1), 31–56. 
 
Wilson, J., & Hornby, L. (2015, January 29). Mongolia holds text message vote on mining v. austerity. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/9f0745bc-a7b5-11e4-8e78-
00144feab7de  
 
Wing, A. K., & Kassim, H. A. (2011). After the last judgment: The future of the Egyptian constitution. 
Harvard International Law Journal Online, 52, 301–310. Retrieved from 
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/HILJ-Online_52_Wing_Kassim1.pdf  
 
World Bank. (2011, March 31). Mongolia: Information and communications infrastructure development 
project. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/03/31/mongolia-
information-and-communications-infrastructure-development-project  
4400  Allison Hahn International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 




Zarefsky, D. (1992). Spectator politics and the revival of public argument. Communication Monographs, 
59, 411–414. 
 
Zarefsky, D. (2009). Strategic maneuvering in political argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen 
(Eds.), Examining argumentation in context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 115–
130). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins. 
 
Zoljargal, M. (2013, November 30). Ulaanbaatar residents support continuation of license plate traffic 
restriction. UB Post. Retrieved from http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/?p=6905    
 
Zuulaakk. (2015, January 31). 1-ийг сонгохымуу? 2ыг сонгохымуу? Хольчмоор л харагдаад бхын 
#15151111" 1,5 уу :) [Choose 1 or choose 2? It is all about being flexible; vote 1.5] [Tweet]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/zulaakk/status/561528810521108480  
 
